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Abstract  
This paper deals with the impact of poor business environment on Total Factor Productivity 
(TFP), output and investment of manufacturing firms in Senegal. A benchmark study coupled 
with results from the World Bank Enterprise Survey narrowed down the list of relevant 
constraints to doing business in Senegal. As a result, a Real Business Cycle model in a Small 
Open Economy is used to measure the impact of crime, corruption, power interruptions, poor 
infrastructures, and tax burden and regulations.  Results show that poor business environment 
has sizeable negative impact on output and investment which is a common feature of recent 
studies. Solving those problems would lead to both investment and output increasing 
respectively by 94% and 79%. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
There has been a great deal of papers dedicated to the output enhancing role of 
investment (Solow 1956, Mankiw 2002, Stiglitz 2000, Krueger 2010) in relation to the 
opportunities in terms of capital, jobs, and technology. In this respect, business 
environment needs to be eased and attractive enough in order to encourage investment. 
Business environment can be defined as the legal, fiscal, institutional and regulatory 
conditions in which firms operate. The impact of business environment improvement on 
investment has been the focus of many studies (Dethier and al 2010, Venture 1997, 
Sinha and Fiestas 2011). Those papers identified productivity as being the vehicle 
through which business environment improvement affects firms’ performance.  The 
awareness of the crucial role of private sector in stimulating output growth led the 
Senegalese government with the World Bank support to hold since 2002 annual 
meetings of the committee in charge of investment as part of its Accelerated Growth 
Strategy. Both private and public sectors are represented in the committee which 
mission is to identify the main constraints to investment in order to address them. 
Furthermore, the government created establishments such as the Investment Promotion 
Agency, the Exports Promotion Agency, and the Department of Private Sector Support. 
These initiatives led to Senegal achieving significant progress in areas such starting 
business or resolving insolvency. Yet, Senegal is still lags behind many countries as 
shown in the latest Doing Business report (2014) losing 8 places and reaching the 178
th
 
position among 189 countries. Furthermore, poor business environment is still a major 
concern according to firms interrogated in the opinion survey performed monthly by the 
Department of Forecasting and Economic Studies. Moreover, the average growth of 
private investment has only been 3.6% between 2000 and 2012 and represents 17.7% of 
GDP. And foreign direct investment accounted for only 2% of GDP in 2001-2011 and 
grew at an average rhythm of 0.3% between 2002 and 2011. A research dedicated to 
business environment is therefore justifiable in order to identify the main weaknesses of 
Senegal and measure their impact.  Precisely, the study is going to evaluate the effect of 
poor business environment on investment and output of manufacturing firms in Senegal. 
For this purpose, data from the World Bank Enterprise Survey along with conclusions 
drawn from a descriptive study are going to serve as inputs in a Small Open Economy 
(SOE) approach (Mendoza, 1991).  
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The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: the next section is dedicated to 
the stylized facts, then theoretical and empirical literature is summarized, the 
methodology is presented in section 4, the model is calibrated to reflect Senegalese data 
at section 5, section 6 shows the main results and their interpretation and finally section 
7 draws the conclusions and gives recommendations. 
II. STYLIZED FACTS 
Let’s take a look at the Senegal’s Doing Business results against better 
performing countries. Comparing countries are chosen from the same category as 
Senegal i.e. Lower Middle Income countries according to the World Bank classification.  
Thus, countries selected to be part of the sample that compares to Senegal are Cape 
Verde, Morocco, India, and Ghana. Senegal lags behind these countries in terms of the 
overall Doing Business ranking.  
    
Figure 1: Doing Business ranking 
 
Source: 2014 Doing Business Report, World Bank 
 
 Figure 1 shows that improvements are necessary in the following areas if 
Senegal wants to catch up with the other countries: 
 
- Electricity connections; 
- credit access; 
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- property registration; 
- protection of investors; 
- tax payment and; 
- contract enforcement. 
 
Table 1 provides a more detailed view of those variables for a better 
understanding of Senegal’s weaknesses. Clearly, tremendous efforts are to be made in 
areas such as electricity connection and property registration to reduce the costs and the 
time spent. The Challenge the tax administration faces is to ease the tax payment 
process by shortening the time spent by taxpayers and reducing the number of 
payments. Poor results are also obtained by Senegal compared to the other countries of 
the sample for the credit access and investors protection indicators. With regards to 
credit access, improvements are needed in the coverage, extent and quality of credit 
information available through public credit registries and private credit bureaus.   
Indicators also show that in Senegal, the corporate legislation fails to protect minority 
shareholders in the event that directors use corporate assets to serve their own benefit. 
This is reflected in the low performances of the “Extent of director liability” and “Ease 
of shareholder suits” indexes. So, more precision is now provided on the reasons 
Senegal lags behind the other countries with regards to Doing Business parameters. 
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Table 1. Doing Business indicators: countries comparison 
Getting electricity 
 Procedures 
(number) 
       Time (days)            Cost (% income per capita) 
Cape Verde                     7                         88                                               888.0 
India                                7                          67                                               230.7 
Ghana                              4                         79                                             2,295.3 
Morocco                          5                         62                                            2,476.3 
Senegal                            8                        113                                           5,918.2 
Registering property 
 Procedures 
(number) 
      Time (days)            Cost (% property value) 
Cape Verde                    6                              22                                              3.7 
India                                5                              44                                              7.0 
Ghana                             5                              34                                              1.2 
Morocco                         8                              60                                              5.9 
Senegal                           6                            122                                           15.2 
Getting credit 
 Strength of 
legal rights 
index (0-10)           
depth of credit 
information 
index (0-6) 
Public registry 
coverage (% of 
adults) 
Private bureau 
coverage (% of 
adults) 
Cape Verde                    3                               5                             17.3                              0.0 
India                                8                               5                               0.0                            19.8 
Ghana                             8                               5                               0.0                             10.4 
Morocco                         3                               5                               0.0                             19.6 
Senegal                           6                               1                               1.0                              0.0 
Paying taxes 
 payments 
(number per 
year) 
time (hours per 
year) 
total tax rate (% of profit) 
Cape Verde                      30                          186                                              37.2 
India                                  33                          243                                              62.8 
Ghana                               32                          224                                              22.9 
Morocco                           6                            232                                              49.6 
Senegal                             59                         644                                              48.5 
Protecting investors 
 Extent of 
disclosure 
index (0-10) 
Extent of 
director liability 
index (0-10) 
Ease of 
shareholder 
suits index (0-
10) 
Strength of 
investor 
protection 
index (0-10) 
Cape Verde              1 5 6     4.0 
India                                     7                                 4                                 8                                6.3 
Ghana                                  7                                 5                                 7                                6.3 
Morocco                              6                                 2                                 6                                4.7 
Senegal                                6                                 1                                 2                                3.0 
Enforcing contracts 
 Procedures 
(number) 
     Time (days)         Cost (% of claim) 
Cape Verde           37                                425                                        19.8 
India           46                                      1,420       39.6 
Ghana           36              495       23.0 
Morocco           40              510       25.2 
Senegal           43              770       36.4 
Source : 2014 Doing Business report, World Bank  
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Furthermore, areas where Senegal shows poor performance are also indicators 
that it fails to significantly improve as shown in the appendix. 
Additional variables such as corruption and governance quality matter when it 
comes to appreciate business environment quality. That information is available through 
indicators provided by the World Bank and Transparency International. Evidence of the 
positive effects of governance and institutions quality on growth can be found in 
Acemoglu and al. (2001) and Rodrik and al. (2004) Table 2 shows performances 
achieved by the same set of countries with regards to the perception of corruption and 
the quality of public sector management and institutions: 
Table 2 Institutions quality and corruption 
 
CPIA public sector 
management and 
institutions ( 1 - 6) 
Corruption 
perception index 
Cape Verde 4 60 
Ghana 3.7 45 
India 3.6 36 
Morocco 
 
37 
Senegal 3.6 36 
Note : low corruption indexes corresponds to high level of  perceived 
corruption 
Sources : World Development Indicators Database for CPIA and 
Transparency International for CPI in 2012  
 
 
Senegal obtains the lowest performance in terms of corruption perception but 
while obtaining the same level as India and being close to Morocco. Senegal shares 
therefore the 94
th
 rank (among 178 countries) with India according to the Transparency 
International rating. Transparency International also provides a detailed view of 
corruption perception by institution. Table 3 displays results achieved by our sample of 
countries for a selected number of institutions: 
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Table 3: corruption perception 
 Parliament
/legislatur
e 
(*) 
Business/ 
private 
sector 
(*) 
Judiciary 
(*) 
Police (*) Registry 
and permit 
services 
(**) 
Tax 
revenue 
authorities 
(**) 
customs 
(**) 
 
Ghana 3,6 3.0 4.0 4.7 4.1 3.7 4.1 
India 3.8 3.4 3.3 4.1 3.7 3.1 3.3 
Morocco 3.8 3.6 4.0 4.2 3.1 2.9 3.1 
Senegal 3.6 2.9 4.0 4.1 4.2 3.4 4.2 
Sources: (*) Transparency international, Global Corruption Barometer, 2013 
(**)Transparency International Bribe Payers Survey, 2008 
1=not at all corrupt, 5=extremely corrupt 
Cape Verde data are not available 
 
 
This detailed view provides additional information that could explain delays and 
high costs observed earlier for Senegal especially in the property registration and tax 
payment procedures.  
This comparative study showed areas of business environment that Senegal 
needs to improve to catch up with other better performing countries. Concretely, if 
lessons were to be learnt from those countries, advice would be: 
- to reduce significantly costs and time spent in electricity connections and 
property registration procedures; 
- to shorten the time spent to pay taxes and to reduce the number of payments; 
- to improve credit access and investors protection and; 
- alleviate corruption. 
Obstacles revealed by the benchmark study are listed among the top 10 business 
environment constraints quoted by responding firms of the World Bank Enterprise 
Survey for Senegal performed in 2007. 
 
III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A look into previous publications dealing with the impact of business 
environment is a crucial step toward picking an approach to bring supporting evidence 
to this study. Since business environment is made up of a set of variables, research 
dedicated to it is multidimensional. From a global perspective, Collier (2000) considers 
that a poor business environment leads to high transaction costs affecting mostly 
manufacturing industries in Africa. Bah and Fang (2010) apply the aggregation of a set 
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of obstacles to investment climate as a tax on production and use a general equilibrium 
model to measure its impact on output and productivity in sub-Saharan African firms. 
They find significant and sizeable effect.  Thus, their results show that poor business 
environment account for about 80% of the income per capita difference between the US 
and the thirty African countries of the sample. According to, Hornberger, Battat and 
Kuzek (2011), besides business opportunities, strong institutions and investor-friendly 
regulations also matter to attract foreign direct investment. Durlauf, Kourtellos and Tan 
(2008) also provide evidence supporting the relationship between institutions and 
growth.  
In other respects, a series research articles dealing with the effect of competition 
reform policy and entry barriers are compiled by Kitzmuller and Licetti (2012).  Among 
the publications cited in that review, the article of Jayne and Argwings-Kodhek (1997) 
study the impact of opening the market and eliminating price control on maize in Kenya 
using household survey data. The outcome is that the measure is beneficial for 
consumers who could save yearly an amount of 10.1 million dollars US as a result of 
cost reductions. Another contribution from the same series is from Ros (2011) who 
showed using Mexico data that encouraging competition by opening air transport and 
routes to low-cost entrants has a positive influence on air fares which drop up to 37%. 
The impact of entry barriers is measured by Fang (2009) through a competition model.  
Results show that entry barriers on products market lead to less competition and the 
recourse to less productive technology and productivity can be affected badly.      
Infrastructures have also been a focus of many publications with regards to their 
impact on firms’ performance.  Thus, Dollar, Hallward-Driemeier, and Mengistae using 
survey data from Bangladesh, China, India and Pakistan and controlling for firm 
characteristics and region or country-level effects, show that power outages have a 
negative impact on Total Factor Productivity (TFP). Aterido and Hallward-Driemeier 
(2007) also focusing on power shortages conclude to negative effect on employment 
growth in African firms. Further contributions on the negative impact of poor 
infrastructures on TFP are found in Escribano and Guash (2005), Escribano, Guash and 
Peña (2010), and Bastos and Nasir (2004).  Finance access and costs are often listed 
among the most important constraints faced by firms. That’s the reason why numerous 
research articles dedicated to investigations related to this indicated have been released. 
As an example, Amaral and Quintin (2010) using a discrete Overlapping-Generations 
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(OLG) model that compare the US economy to a sample of countries in terms of 
financial enforcement which measures the ability to direct capital towards the 
production sector. They bring evidence suggesting that differences in financial 
enforcement explain significantly income gaps across countries as they find sizeable 
impact on output.  Gelb and al (2007) study the finance access constraint and conclude 
that the severity of that obstacle declines as the country‘s GDP level increases. But firm 
size also matters when it comes to credit access as demonstrated by Beck, Demirgüc-
Kunt and Maksimovic (2005). Same results are obtained by Asterido, Hallward-
Driemeier and Pagès (2007) using firm survey to show that smaller firms face more 
difficulties accessing credit and therefore turn to informal sources to finance most of 
their investment. 
Corruption is also an important constraint which severe adverse effects can deter 
firms from investing.  Mauro (1995) investigates the impact of corruption from cross 
country analysis and finds that it lowers investment and by extension economic growth. 
Fisman and Svensson (2007) draw similar conclusion from a sample of Ugandan firms. 
They show that sales growth is significantly and negatively influenced by corruption. 
 
IV. THE MODEL 
So far, Senegal’s main business environment areas that need improvement have 
been identified and an overview of some of the existing theories and approaches has 
been presented. These previous steps helped in the choice of the suitable model to 
quantify the impact of business environment. Therefore, the neoclassical Real Business 
Cycle Model in a Small Open Economy (Mendoza (1991)) is used in this paper. This 
approach proved satisfactory in portraying macroeconomic dynamics observed in 
modern open economies (Plosser 1989, Kydland and Prescott 1982, McCallum 1989). 
In particular, the rationale under which investment and savings adjust to smooth 
consumption is a result that the model successfully generates. And most importantly, it 
has successfully replicated key stylized facts of the US Economy during the post second 
war period. Business environment is introduced following Bah and Fang (2010) 
assumption. Thereby, poor business environment is supposed to act as a charge 
affecting production. Here it is introduced as a technological shock. Data from the 
World Bank Enterprise are going to be used to determine the business environment 
parameter. More details will be provided at the calibration section. 
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The model considers an economy populated by a large number of identical 
infinitely-lived individuals with preferences described as follows: 
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Where tC  is consumption in period t , tN is labor,   is the discount factor and 
  is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
The evolution of capital stock is pictured by the following equation: 
    1 1 ttt KIK   
10    
Where tK is the capital stock, tI represents gross investment,  is a constant rate 
of depreciation. The initial capital stock is given. 
Agents have access to international financial markets where they can exchange 
financial assets tF  for real interest rate 
*
tr  with the rest of the world which 
mathematically formulated as: 
 
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Where tBC  is trade balance. 
Output is produced according to the following technology: 
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Where tY  is output, tZ represents total factor productivity and  
2
1
2
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






is 
the adjustment cost of capital. The latter variable is usually introduced in the small open 
economy approach to limit the speed of capital accumulation. It thereby avoids 
excessive investment volatility in reaction to interest rate fluctuations. 
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The resource constraint establishes simply that on cannot consume more than 
earnings which means that the sum of consumption, investment and trade balance 
cannot exceed gross output net of adjustment costs: 
 1 tttttt KKYBCIC  
Individuals maximize their utility which corresponds to solving the following 
program: 
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The corresponding Lagrangian can be written as: 
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First order conditions or Euler equations can be straightforwardly determined by 
calculating the derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to tC , tN , tK and t and setting 
them to 0: 
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Furthermore, the following equation is obtained from the definition of returns: 
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Now, let’s just rewrite the first order conditions without the time indices to 
obtain the steady state: 
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Once the steady state is determined, constraints and first order conditions are 
log-linearized according to Uhlig (1991) procedure. The principle is to use a Taylor 
approximation around the steady state transforming all equations to obtain 
approximated log-deviations from the steady state which facilitates results 
interpretation. 
Therefore, let tc be the logarithmic deviation of tC  from its steady state C : 
   CCc tt loglog   
 
If for example 05,0tc , it means that tC  approximately exceed its steady value 
of 5%. Uhlig linearization method applied tC  yields : 
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 Thus, the linearization of the resource constraint is obtained using that 
technique and the steady state equation  9 : 
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So are the remaining equations: 
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This system is then solved using the method of undetermined coefficients 
documented in Uhlig (1991). The principle of the method is to rewrite the system as 
linear functions of a vector of endogenous and exogenous variables. The idea is that 
some variables are predetermined so given. Those are called state variables: in this 
paper 1tk  and tz . The other variables are therefore determined by solving a quadratic 
matrix. 
 
V. CALIBRATION 
An advantage of this model is that it doesn’t require time series but parameters 
need to be set to fit main features of the Senegalese economy data. Such procedure is 
called calibration. 
So starting with , the risk aversion coefficient, it is evaluated at 1, consistent 
with previous studies (Mendoza’s (1991)). Diagne and Fall (2007) estimate the capital 
share   at 0.35 based on a sample of Senegalese manufacturing industries. Its rate of 
depreciation   is also taken from the same study and is set to be 0.1. Diagne and Fall 
(2007) also measure hours of labor to be 0.21 which is less than 0.3, Hansen’s (1985) 
result for developed countries.  
Let   be the parameter of poor business environment. As mentioned earlier, it 
represents the sum of constraints to business environment. The main obstacles identified 
at the stylized facts section are electricity, corruption, access to finance, and tax 
payments. The World Bank Enterprise Survey (2007) provides data measuring those 
constraints as a loss in percentage of sales. The survey was conducted on 506 
Senegalese manufacturing firms. This study considers electricity, crime and corruption, 
poor infrastructures and tax payment which add up to 0.15. 
Furthermore, the technological term Z  is set at 1. The autoregressive coefficient 
  of technological shock is estimated at 0.91 and its standard deviation  , 0.21. World 
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real interest rate is calibrated at 4% (see Mendoza (1991)). The adjustment cost of 
capital  is measured so as to reflect the volatility of investments. Simulations led to a 
value of 0.017. The model’s parameters are summarized in table 4: 
 
Table 4. Calibrated parameters 
Risk aversion coefficient   1 
   
Capital Share   0.35 
   
Capital rate of depreciation   0.10 
   
Technological factor Z  1 
   
hours of work N  0,21 
   
charge (poor business 
environment)   0.15 
   
World real interest rate R  0.04 
   
autoregressive coefficient 
of the technological shock   0.91 
   
Standard deviation of the 
technological shock   0.20 
   
Adjustment cost of capital   0.017 
 
    
VI. RESULTS 
Prior to generating results from the model, tests for rightness of fit needs to be 
done. Therefore, observed data from Senegal are examined against those generated by 
the model. Table 5 indicates that correlations of output with consumption and capital 
calculated from real data are close to those generated by the model. Therefore, the 
model replicates reasonably the Senegalese economy and can now be used to measure 
the impact of business environment. 
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Table 5. Correlation coefficient with respect to ouput 
Variables 
PERIODES 
t-1 t t+1 
Model Real data Model Real data Model Real 
data 
C  0.10 0.07 0.83 0.79 0.26 0.20 
K  0.86 0.81 0.77 0.73 0.63 0.61 
Y  0.87 0.84 1 1 0.64 0.63 
Note : observed series are in logarithme 
 
A 1% technological shock is simulated according to two scenarios. The first one 
is the baseline scenario. In the second scenario, conditions are worsened by a poor 
business environment. Figure 2 shows the impulse response functions of capital stock, 
investment, output and financial assets in both scenarios: 
 
Figure 2. Impulse response functions 
  
  
 
The simulation period is eight years. The overall view of the results shows 
symmetry of the scenarios. They go separate ways. The productivity shock has sizable 
negative impact on capital stock. Investment which is a function of capital accumulation 
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is also strongly affected. However, the deviation from steady state contracts as time 
runs. Large negative effect is also observed on output.  
The adjusting behavior of savings to smooth consumption is found through 
individuals holding more financial assets at the beginning of the period in reaction to the 
productivity shock which a common feature of real business cycle models. 
Table 6 shows the average impact of poor business environment: 
 
Table 6. Impact of business environment 
Average in 8 
years 
target variable response (en %) 
 K  I  F  Y  
Z (negative 
productivity 
shock) -79 -94 +4 -79 
     
 
 
The average investment could have increase by 94% if constraints to business 
environment were eliminated. Poor business environment also accounts for 79% output 
loss. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This paper shows sizeable impact of poor business environment measured by 
constraints on electricity, crime and corruption, poor infrastructures and tax payment on 
investment and output in Senegalese manufacturing firms. Those obstacles are priority 
issues to be addressed as they account for 94% and 79% losses respectively in 
investment and output. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. and Robinson, J.A. (2001). Reversal of Fortune: Geography And 
Institutions In The Making Of The Modern World Income Distribution. NBER Working 
Papers  
8460; National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. 
 
Ades,A. and Chua, H.B. (1997). Thy Neighbor's Curse: Regional Instability and Economic  
Growth. Journal of Economic Growth Vol. 2, No. 3 (Sep., 1997), pp. 279-304. 
 
Amaral, P.S. and Quintin, E. (2010). Limited Enforcement, Financial Intermediation, and  
Economic Development: A quantitative assessment. International Economic Review Vol. 51,  
No. 3, August 2010. 
 
Aterido, R. and Hallward-Driemeier, M. (2007). Impact of Access to Finance, Corruption and 
Infrastructure on Employment Growth: Does Sub-Saharan Africa Mirror Other Low-Income  
Regions.  Policy Research Working Paper  5218. World Bank, Washington. 
 
Aterido, R., Hallward-Driemeier, M. and Page´s, C. (2007). Business Climate and  
Employment Growth: The Impact of Access to Finance, Corruption and Regulations Across  
Firms. Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Discussion Paper 3138, Bonn. 
 
Bah, E.H. and Fang, L. (2010). Impact of the Business Environment on Output and  
Productivity in Africa. The University of Auckland, The Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. 
 
Baliamoune-Lutz, M. and  Ndikumana, L. (2008). Corruption and Growth in African  
Countries: Exploring the Investment Channel, 2008. University of Massachusetts Amherst  
Working Paper. 
 
Barseghyan, L. (2008). Entry Costs and Cross-Country Differences in Productivity and 
Output. Journal of Economic Growth, 2008, 13 (1), 145-167. 
 
Bastos, F. and Nasir, J. (2004). Productivity and the Business climate: What Matters Most?  
Policy Research Working Paper 3335. World Bank, Washington. 
 
Battat, J., Hornberger, K. and Kuzek, P. (2011). Attracting FDI: How Much Does Investment  
Climate Matter? The World Bank Group Financial and Private Sector Development Vice  
Presidency, august 2011, Note number 327. 
 
Beck, T., Demirguc-Kunt, A. and Levine, R. (2000). A New Database on Financial  
Development and Structure. World Bank Economic Review, 2000, 14 (3), 597-605. 
 
Beck, T., Laeven, L. and  Levine, R. (2008). Finance, Firm Size, and Growth. Journal of  
Money, Credit and Banking, October 2008, 40 (7), 1379-1405. 
 
 
18 
 
Beck, T., Levine, R. and Loayza, N. (2000).  Finance and the Sources of Growth. Journal of  
Financial Economics, 2000, 58, 261-300. 
 
Belhocine, N. (2004). Solving and Closing a Small-Open-Economy. Economics 826: 
International Finance. 
 
Collier, P. (2000). Africa's Comparative Advantage. Hossein Jalilian, Michael Tribe, and John  
Weiss, eds. Industrial Development and Policy in Africa, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar  
2000, pp. 865-934. 
 
Dethier, J.J.,Hirn, M. and Straub, S. (2011). Explaining Enterprise Performance in  
Developing Countries with Business Climate Survey Data. The World Bank Research  
Observer, vol. 26, pp.258-309. 
 
Diagne, Y.S. and  Fall, A. (2007). Impact des infrastructures publiques sur la productivité des  
entreprises au Sénégal. Direction de la Prévision et des Etudes Economiques, août 2007.   
 
Djankov, S.,  La Porta, R., Lopez de Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. (2002). The Regulation of  
Entry.  Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 2002, 117 (1), 1-37. 
 
Dollar, D., Hallward-Driemeier, M. and  Mengistae, T. (2005). Business Climate and Firm  
Performance in Developing Economies. Economic Development and Cultural Change 54:1– 
31. 
 
Durlauf, S.N., Kourtellos, A. and Tan, C.M. (2008). Are Any Growth Theories Robust? The  
Economic Journal 118(527): 329–46. 
 
Escribano, A. and Guasch, J.L. (2005). Assessing the Impact of the Business climate on  
Productivity Using Firm Level Data: Methodology and the Cases of Guatemala, Honduras,  
and Nicaragua. Policy Research Working Paper 3621. World Bank, Washington. 
 
Escribano, A., Guasch, J.L. and  Peña, J. (2010). Assessing the Impact of Infrastructure  
Quality on Firm Productivity in Africa: Cross-Country Comparisons Based on Business 
climate  
Surveys from 1999 to 2005. Policy Research Working Paper 5191. World Bank, Washington. 
 
Fang, L. (2009). Entry Barriers, Competition, and Technology Adoption. 2009, Federal 
Bank of Atlanta Working Paper No. 2009-8. 
 
Fisman, R. and Love, I. (2007). Financial Dependence and Growth Revisited. The Journal of  
the European Economic Association, April-May 2007, 5, 470-479. 
 
Fisman, R. and Svennson, J. (2007). Are Corruption and Taxation Really Harmful to Growth?  
Firm Level Evidence. Journal of Development Economics 83:63–75. 
 
 
 
Gelb, A., Ramachandran, V., Kedia-Shah, M. and Turner, G. (2007). What Matters to African  
19 
 
Firms? The Relevance of Perceptions Data. Policy Research Working Paper 4446 World 
Bank,  
Washington. 
 
Goldsmith, R. (1969). Financial Structure and Development, New haven, CT: Yale University  
Press, 1969. 
 
Hansen, G. D. (1985). Indivisible labor and the business cycle. Journal of Monetary  
Economics 16(3), 309–27. 
 
Hairault, J.O., Langot, F. and Portier, F. (1997). Time to implement and aggregate  
Fluctuations. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 22, 1997, 109-121. 
 
Herrendorf, B. and Teixeira, A. (2009). Barriers to Entry and Development. December  
2009. Forthcoming in International Economic Review. 
 
Hornberger.K., Battat.J. and Kusek, P. (2011). Attracting FDI: How much does investment  
climate matters. ViewPoint Public Policy for the Private Sector Series, No 327, Finance and  
Private Sector Presidency, The World Bank Group, 2011.  
 
Jayne, T.S. and Argwings-Kodhek, G. (1997). Consumer Response to Maize Market  
Liberalization in Urban Kenya. Food Policy 22 (5): 447–58. 
 
Jorgensen, O.H. (2006). The General Procedure for Solving Stochastic Overlapping 
Generations Models Analytically. October 2006. University of Southern Denmark. 
 
Kitzmuller, M. and Licetti, M.M. (2012). Competition Policy: Encouraging Thriving Markets  
for Development. ViewPoint Public Policy for the Private Sector Series, No 331, Finance and  
Private Sector Presidency, The World Bank Group, 2013. 
 
Kydland, F.E. and Prescott, E.C. (1982). Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctuations.  
Econometrica, Journal of the Econometric Society, Vol. 50, No. 6 (Nov., 1982), pp. 1345- 
1370.     
 
King, R. and Levine, R. (1993). Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be Right,” Quarterly  
Journal of Economics, August 1993, 108, 717-738. 
 
Kotov, D. (2008). How Changing Investment Climate Impacts on the Foreign Investors  
Investment Decision: Evidence from FDI in Germany International Conference on Applied  
Economics. 
 
Krueger,  A.O.  (2010). Increased Understanding of Supply-side Economics. Conference  
volume. 
 
 
 
Lall, S.V. and Meginstae, T. (2005). The impact of business environment and economic 
geography on plant level productivity: an analysis of Indian industry. Development Research  
Group The World Bank. 
20 
 
 
Lubik, T.A. (2007). Non-Stationarity and Instability in Small Open-Economy Models Even  
When They Are Closed. Economic Quarterly Volume 93, Number 4, fall 2007, Pages 393- 
412. 
 
Lucas, R. (1978). On the Size Distribution of Business Firms. Bell Journal of Economics 9  
(1978), 508–23. 
 
Mankiw, G. (2002). Macroeconomics. Worth Publishers. 5th edition, 548 pages. 
 
Mauro, P. (1996). The effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment, and Government 
Expenditures. 1996. IMF Working Paper No. 96/98. 
 
McKinnon, R. (1973). Money and Capital in Economic Development. Washington, DC: 
The Brookings Institution, 1973. 
 
Mendoza, E. (1991). Real business cycles in a small open economy. American Economic  
Review 81, 797-889. 
 
Ndikumana, L. (2000).  Financial Determinants of Domestic Investment in Sub-Saharan  
Africa: Evidence from Panel Data. World Development, February 2000, 28, 381-400. 
 
Nicoletti, G. and  Scarpetta, S. (2003). Regulation, productivity and growth: OECD  
Evidence. Economic Policy, 2003, 18 (36), 9-72. 
 
Parente, S.L. and Prescott, E.C. (1994). Barriers to Technology Adoption and Development.  
Journal of Political Economy, April 1994, 102 (2), 298-321. 
 
Rajan, R.G. and Zingales, L. (1998). Financial Dependence and Growth. The American  
Economic Review, June 1998, 88, 559-586. 
 
Rodrik, D., Subramanian, A. and Trebbi, F. (2004). Institutions Rule: The Primacy of 
Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development. Journal of Economic 
Growth, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 131-165, 06.  
 
Ros, A. J. (2011). The Determinants of Pricing in the Mexican Domestic Airlines Sector.  
Review of Industrial Organization 38 (1): 43–60. 
 
Shaw, E. (1973). Financial Deepening in Economic Development. New York, NY: Oxford  
University Press, 1973. 
 
Sinha, S. and Fiestas, I. (2011). Literature review on the constraints to investment in  
developing countries. Department for International Development. 
Solow, R. (1956). A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth. Quaterly Journal of  
Economics (February 1956): 65-94. 
 
Stiglitz, J.E. (2000). Capital Market Liberalization, Economic Growth, and Instability. World  
Development Vol. 28, No. 6, pp. 1075-1086, 2000. 
 
21 
 
Uhlig, H. (1999). A Toolkit for Analyzing Nonlinear Dynamic Stochastic Models Easily.  
CentER University of Tilburg and CEPR. 
 
Venture, J. (1997). Growth and Interdependence. Quarterly Journal of Economics, volume  
112 number 1 February:57-84. International Trade and Foreign Direct Investments in:  
International Encyclopedia of Business and Management (1998). 
 
Wagle,S. (2010). Investing across Borders with Heterogeneous Firms: Do FDI-Specific  
Regulations Matter? FPD Working Paper, World Bank Group, Washington, DC. 
 
Weber, H. (2003). Examining news shocks, University of Berlin. 
 
Wegmüller, P. (2011). Closing small open economy models. Replicating the model by  
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe [2003] with Dynare. May 2011, University of Bern.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 
 
Distance to frontier 
Starting a business Getting credit 
  
Dealing with construction permits Registering property 
  
Protecting investors Paying taxes 
  
Trading accross borders Enforcing contracts 
  
Source : Doing Business, 2014, Worldbank 
Note : distance to frontier shows how countries improve the indicators over time. The frontier corresponds to the best 
performance observed. The distance ranges between 0 and 100; 0 being the lowest performance and 100 is the frontier. 
Senegal is compared to Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique and Rwanda.  
Dotted lines represent Senegal’s performance. 
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Distance to frontier : continued 
Resolving insolvency Getting electricity 
  
Source : Doing Business, 2014, Worldbank 
Note : distance to frontier shows how countries improve the indicators over time. The frontier corresponds to the best 
performance observed. The distance ranges between 0 and 100; 0 being the lowest performance and 100 is the frontier. 
Senegal is compared to Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique and Rwanda.  
Dotted lines represent Senegal’s performance. 
 
